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19471 NOTES AND COMMENTS 260
sufficient constitutional authority in Indiana to permit the
extension of the rule announced in the principal case.4 While
such an extension would seem to be a logical cdrollary con-
sistent with the theory of the rule, at least one Indiana case
has refused to extend to confessions, the remedy allowed in
the case of unlawful searches and seizures.5
DAMAGES
RECOVERY FOR LOSS OF USE OF DESTROYED AUTOMOBILE
Plaintiff's truck was destroyed and due to postwar short-
ages, he could not obtain another for eight months. In a
suit for damages for the negligent destruction of the truck,
an additional sum was asked to compensate for lost use. Held:
Motion to strike allegation of damages for lost use from the
complaint sustained. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Harrell, 66
F. Supp. 559 (W.D. Okla. 1946).
That damages cannot be recovered for loss of use of a
destroyed chattel is clearly the general rule.' But the rule
is based upon the normal availability of replacements and the
plaintiff's duty to replace the property. In 1945, with ab-
normal conditions prevailing because of the war, the plaintiff
was unable to fulfill his duty of replacement.
The court based its decision not only on the rule of dam-
ages stated above, but on the furthdr point that defendant's
4. Ind. Const. Art. I, §14: "No person shall be put in jeopardy twice
for the same offense. No person, in any criminal prosecution,
shall be compelled to testify against himself."
5. "The appellant sought to follow the procedure for quashing a
search warrant and suppressing the evidence procured thereunder,
which is not an appropriate practice in case of confessions."
Kokenes v. State, 213 Ind. 476,481, 13 N.E. (2d) 524,526 (1938).
1. Barnes v. United Rys. and Elec. Co. of Baltimore, 140 Md. 14, 116
Atl. 855 (1922); German v. Centaur Lime Co., 295 S.W. 475 (St.
Louis C.A. 1927) (relied on heavily in decision of instant case);
Adams v. Bell Motors Inc., 9 La. App. 441, 121 So. 345 (1928);
Colonial Motor Coach Corp. v. New York Cent. R.R., 131 Misc.
891, 228 N.Y.S. 508 (S. Ct. 1928); Johnson v. Thompson, 35 Ohio
App. 91, 172 N.E. 298 (1929). See 6 Blashfield, "Cyclopedia of
Automobile Law and Practice" (Penn. ed. 1945)41: "Where an
automobile is practically destroyed, or so completely destroyed
as not to be susceptible of repair, the mesure of damages is its
reasonable market value immediately before the accident, without
any additional allowance for hiring another car." Damages have
been disallowed for lost use when the automobile, although it could
be partially repaired, could not be restored to as good a condition
as before the accident. Helin v. Egger, 121 Neb. 727, 238 N.W.
364 (1931).
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negligence was not the proximate cause of this injury.2 By
taking judicial notice of the scarcity of motor vehicles,8 the
court attempted to establish that circumstance as an "inter-
vening cause." To be an intervening cause, the scarcity of
trucks would have to arise immediately after the accident
and before plaintiff could look for another truck.4 To carry
the court's 'reasoning to its logical conclusion, the scarcity of
repair parts would be an intervening cause in calculating lost
use for a damaged chattel.5 The result would be to compen-
sate a plaintiff only for the time actually spent in repairing
the chattel.6 Such an argument, however, ignores the ac-
cepted doctrine that the natural and probable result of a
negligent act or omission is in law held to have been contem-
2. See principal case at 561.
3. Judicial notice has recently been taken of various economic phe-
nomena caused by the late war. Bowles v. Munsingwear, Inc.,
63 F.Supp. 933 (D. Minn. 1945) (material shortages, in-
creased labor costs, and higher prices predicted in all civilian
consumer goods after the outbreak of World War II); Wilkins
v. San Bernardino, 162 P.(2d) "711 (Cal. App. 1945) (housing
shortage existed in San Bernardino and in -many other places in
California); In re Beall's Will, 184 Misc. 881, 54 N.Y.S.(2d) 869
(Surr. Ct. 1945) (war-time conditions, non-manufacture of autos
for civilian use, and comparatively high prices for used cars.)
4. Cf. Ruffin Coal and Tr. Co. v. Rich, 214 Ala. 633, 108 So. 596(1926), (D's truck negligently knocked P's auto into path of ap-
proaching street car, the resulting collision causing injury. The
court rejected defense theory that street car was an intervening
cause, reasoning that D's negligence placed P's auto in a position
where presence of the street car only aggravated the damage
already done by D.) It is submitted that the existence of the
truck shortage in the Magnolia case can be likened to the presence
of the street car in the Ruffin case, supra, in that they both ag-
gravated the damage caused by the negligence of the respective
defendants.
5. Wagon injured in collision, P recovered reasonable cost of repairs,
expenses incurred in moving wagon from street and storing it
pending repairs, and reasonable value of its use while being re-
paired. Moore v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 84 App. Div. 613, 82
N.Y.S. 778 (2d Dept. 1903). This rule applies to automobiles,
Hawkins v. Garford Trucking Co., Inc., 96 Conn. 337, 114 Atl. 94
(1921); Bergstrom v. Mellen, :57 Utah 42, 192 Pac. 679 (1920) ;
Stubbs v. Molberget, 108 Wash. 89, 182 Pac. 936 (1919); Meyers v.
Bradford, 54 Cal. App. 157, 201 Pac. 471 (1921).
6. Contra: Lyle v. Seller, 70 Cal. App. 300, 233 Pac. 345 (1924) P's
car, damaged by D's negligence, was fully repaired. The court,
in allowing damages for full period during which auto was im-
mobilized, including time lost while necessary parts were being
ordered and shipped from distant city, reasoned that just as it
was no fault of the P's that the accident occurred, so it was not
her fault that parts were not readily available.
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plated by the negligent party. It is submitted that if the
fact that an auomobile could no be immediaely replaced was
of such common knowledge as to be the subject of judicial
notice, a person could reasonably anticipate a period of lost
use if he negligently destroyed a truck.
EVIDENCE
RELEVANCY OF PLAINTIFF'S WAR RECORD IN PERSONAL
INJURY ACTION
In a personal injury action, plaintiff was permitted to
testify, over objection, that he was in battle three times; han-
dled heavy projectiles; and although wounded once he had
fully recovered before the automobile accident. Held: Ad-
missible to show the strength and health of the plaintiff at
the time of the accident, and to meet any possible contention
that his condition afterward was the result of his military
service. In re New England Transp. Co. et al., 69 N.E. (2d)
479 (Mass. 1946).
The principal case can be defended under the general
proposition that the question of relevancy of testimony is
largely within the discretion of the trial judge.' Ordinarily,
on the question of damages, the plaintiff in a personal injury
suit may show the state of his health prior to the injury.2
However, evidence of prior military service, in the absence
of any contention that it contributed to P's injuries, or that
he was already disabled at that time seems unjustifiable.3
7. Teis v. Smuggler Min. Co. 158 Fed. 260 (C.C.A. 8th, 1907); Bene-
dict Pineapple Co. v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 55 Fla. 514, 46 So. 732
(1908).
1. Western Produce Co., Inc. v. Folliard, 93 F.(2d) 588 (C.C.A. 5th,
1937); New England Trust Co. v. Farr, 57 F.(2d) 103 (C.C.A.
1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 612 (1982); Pacific S.S. Co. v.
Holt, 77 F.(2d) 192 (C.C.A. 9th, 1935); Feichter v. Swift, 77
Ind. App. 427,430, 132 N.E. 662,663 (1921) (by implication).
2. Davis v. Smitherman, 209 Ala. 244, 96 So. 208 (1923); Louisville,
N.A. & C. Ry. v. Wood, 113 Ind. 544,551, 14 N.E. 572,577 (1887)(by implication); Bush v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 350
Mo. 876, 169 S.W. (2d) 331 (1943); Shackleford v. Commercial
Motor Freight, Inc. 65 N.E. (2d) 879 (Ohio 1945).
3. Where such charges are made, of course, the question properly
is placed in issue, and the material may be introduced in rebuttal.
E.G., Western Produce Co., Inc. v. Folliard, 93 F.(2d) 588 (C.C.A.
5th, 1937).
For other cases holding comparable evidence to be objection-
able see Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. v. Godwin, 14 F.(2d) 114 (C.C.A.
5th, 1926) (plaintiff's honorable discharge held improper to show
1947]
